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Copyright Reform and Business Model Innovation: Regulatory Propaganda at 
German Music Industry Conferences 
 
Abstract 
Inspired by new digital technologies, diverse actors in cultural and creative industries 
propagate conflicting visions of how to adequately innovate – or rather preserve and strictly 
enforce – copyright-related business models, which has resulted in substantial amounts of 
regulatory uncertainty. Looking at a decade of regulatory discourse at industry events in the 
popular music industry in Germany, we investigate how these actors make sense of and 
strategically shape this uncertainty in the process of industry transformation. Our longitudinal 
argumentative discourse analysis reveals cycles of regulatory propaganda of two discourse 
coalitions that do not engage in debate, but aim to find support for competing business models 
among regulators and the public. Organizing, canceling, and participating in industry events 
are discursive strategies used effectively to transport their claims by both industry lobbyists 
and challenging actors, but industry incumbents are failing to use these sites for testing out 
and introducing new business models. We conclude that regulatory struggles, not least at 
industry events, mediate between disruptive technologies and business model innovation. 
Keywords 




Recent technological developments, above all the Internet and file sharing software, have 
created uncertainty about whether extant copyright regulation and according business models 
will be sustainable in the future, particularly in the music industry [5,24,42]. During the 
1990s, copyright-related regulatory struggles were fought out predominantly in transnational 
arenas such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO). Subsequently, debates and lobbying efforts shifted to national arenas, 
as the transnational treaties had to be built into national law. European countries are hereby 
expected to follow the EU Copyright Directive, passed by the European Union in 2001 as a 
step towards implementing the WIPO copyright treaty. Today, more than ten years later, even 
large European countries such as Germany have not implemented all parts of the Directive 
and heated debates about copyright reforms continue.  
While the lobbying efforts of major corporations and industry associations for a stronger 
protection of copyrights on a transnational level are already well understood (e.g. 
[25,41,51,66]), we know much less about the national regulatory struggles that followed. This 
is an important gap in both regulation and business studies, as the outcome of these national 
regulatory processes is indispensible for the development of viable business models in the 
music industry specifically (e.g. [6]) and in the so-called copyright industries (e.g. [18,81]) 
more broadly. In order to capture the political dimension of business model innovation that is 
largely missing in research on web-based business models (e.g. [87]), we define business 
model as a new “system of interdependent activities that transcends the focal firm and spans 
its boundaries” [92], but explicitly include the societal level of organizational fields and 
accompanying regulatory issues [43] in this definition as well. This allows us to consider the 
free provision of cultural goods [56] pursued by an increasing number of actors not 
necessarily from the music industry, but from the wider field of copyright regulation as an 
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alternative business model in our analysis and provides a bridge to recent studies on social or 
institutional innovations accompanying the technological ones in processes of industry 
transformation (e.g. [28, 52]). 
Empirically, we follow Hajer’s [36] argumentative discourse analytical approach and study 
the discourse coalitions forming in the German popular music industry around the issue of 
copyright regulation between 2001 and 2010, the decade after the passing of the EU 
Copyright Directive.We investigate how different actors make sense of regulation alternatives 
in the light of old and potential new business models at industry events. Events such as 
conferences have recently been introduced as shared discursive spaces in organizational fields 
where central and peripheral field actors can come together and shape regulatory structures 
[39]. Convening at industry events may thus be a viable strategy for industry actors facing 
regulatory uncertainty in processes of industry transformation. In order to elaborate on our 
understanding of the regulatory and political dimension of business model innovation, we 
study the discoursive struggles among industry incumbents and other field actors unfolding at 
German music industry events and ask: How do different actors in a transforming industry 
address regulatory uncertainty in processes of business model innovation? 
We find, first, that regulatory debate is taking place increasingly at music industry fairs and 
festivals, venues that have not traditionally hosted conference sections. New events and event 
formats have been founded to provide discursive spaces for addressing regulatory uncertainty 
regarding copyright. Second, we find an ebbing and a growing intensity of regulatory debates 
depending on the perceived success of copyright-related business models over time. The 
dominant public narrative throughout our ten-year examination period has revolved around 
the threat posed by Internet file sharing and the call for regulation to protect existing business 
models, manifested in the lobbying efforts of core music industry actors to legally protect 
Digital Rights Management (DRM) technologies against circumenvention [7,79]. As a 
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reaction to these developments, a growing number of organizations and individuals have 
developed a counter-narrative, in which they depict industry incumbents as part of a problem 
rather than the solution to any copyright reform efforts. Without the backing of strong 
corporate support, this challenger coalition consisted (at least initially) mostly of startup 
companies, small online-only music distributors (“netlabels”, see [31]), non-profit 
organizations such as Creative Commons [21], dissident or avant-garde artists and, later in the 
process, the newly founded pirate parties.
3
 By advocating copyright reform and new business 
models that were compatible with new digital technologies such as peer-to-peer file sharing, 
these actors resemble social-movement-like market activists, or “market rebels” [73]. Rather 
than engaging in regulatory conversations [10] and synthesizing new business models, 
however, the competing incumbent and challenging actor groups direct their claims mainly at 
the public and regulators. We thus observe cycles of conflicting regulatory propaganda fueled 
by recurring industry crises within the phases of industry evolution (e.g. [84,70]). The 
outcome of these regulatory debates may well be one of those factors that mediate the passing 
from one stage in the industry life-cycle to the next. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: we introduce our theoretical perspective 
on business models, regulation, and the discursive spaces provided by industry events. Then 
we explain in more detail our research setting, the popular music industry in Germany, and 
outline our methodological approach, methods of data collection, and data analysis. We 
present our findings on overall changes in the music event landscape as well as the discourse 
coalitions forming over time before discussing our results on what we call cycles of 
regulatory propaganda and business model innovation. 
                                            
3
 The German Pirate Party is one of the strongest, holding seats in several municipal and state parliaments. See 
http://governancexborders.com/2011/09/19/boarding-berlin-the-pirate-party-triumph-in-the-german-capital-faq/ 
[accessed November 29, 2011] 
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2. Theoretical Perspectives: Business Models, Regulation, and the Role of 
Discursive Spaces 
Over the last two decades, the difficulties of copyright regulation in accounting for new 
technological developments and enforcing certain parts of copyright such as the right to 
distribute music online have cast doubt on its functionality. In spite – or even because – of its 
repeated revisions (see, e.g. [54]), the accuracy of copyright as a regulatory basis for business 
models has been contested, leading to regulatory uncertainty among actors in copyright-
related industries such as music, film, and publishing. We will now first outline our discursive 
perspective on the link between business model innovation and regulatory uncertainty, and 
then discuss the role of discourse and industry events in this context. 
2.1 Business Model Innovation and Regulatory Uncertainty: A Discursive Perspective 
In ideal terms, a central feature of regulation is the reduction of uncertainty for the actors 
within a given field by making the actions of others more predictable [14]. In an industry 
context, regulation is therefore both restricting and enabling, in that it prescribes a set of 
behaviours against which business models and paths of innovation can be developed. 
Consequently, uncertainty resulting from the absence, complexity, or ambiguity of regulation, 
i.e. regulatory uncertainty, is mostly considered to be problematic for corporate investement 
decisions [71,44]. In the field of environmental regulation, Engau and Hoffmann [26] even 
state that “regulatory uncertainty considerably constrains firms and can adversely affect their 
profitability [12] because the continuous preparation for, and the adjustment to, uncertain 
regulations absorb firm resources”. From the perspective of corporate actors, regulatory 
uncertainty may therefore be defined as the “inability to predict the future state of the 
regulatory environment” [45].  
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As opposed to this predominantly negative view of regulatory uncertainty from an investment 
perspective, others point to the fact that uncertainty also leaves room for innovation. Jauch 
and Kraft [47], for example, argue that an uncertain environment might help actors to be more 
proactive and innovative [60,58,30]. In the history of information and communication 
technologies, business models based upon new technologies such as radio or cable television 
typically created and exploited regulatory uncertainty; often, innovative business models were 
in conflict with extant regulatory structures and became legalized only retroactively (see e.g. 
[88]). In the light of these examples, regulatory uncertainty cannot – and should not – be 
avoided altogether, but is a necessary by-product of innovation processes because it opens up 
the scope of future action within an industry.  
While existing business model research has recognized the link between business model 
innovation, technology and experimentation (e.g. [19]), the role of regulatory uncertainty in 
these processes has rarely been explicitly integrated. Sabatier et al. [75], for instance, focus on 
technological uncertainty and argue that in mature industries such as the drug industry, 
disruptive business models only emerge when new technologies evolve and the associated 
uncertainty decreases. Sainio and Puumalainen [76] examine technological and market 
uncertainties in firms’ interpretations of disruptive technologies, but do not discuss how these 
firms act upon these uncertainties in developing new business models. In this paper, we 
suggest that whether regulatory uncertainty eventually leads to business model innovation is 
contingent upon how this uncertainty is coped with in a given field.  
In order to capture this aspect, we propose to draw on Black’s [10] concept of regulatory 
conversations, by which she conceptualizes regulation as a communicative process “involving 
the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others according to identified 
purposes […, i.e.] the intentional, goal-directed, problem-solving attempts at ordering 
undertaken by both state and non-state actors.” Such a discursive perspective on regulation is 
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important for understanding the development of new business models, especially in the 
copyright industries, because it pays attention to the political-cultural processes unfolding 
among industry incumbents and challengers seeking to define new and legitimate practices 
[29,42]. These practices reach beyond mere value propositions in terms of business profits, 
including the level of social and societal values as well [90]. Most existing research on the 
transformation of these industries, including the music industry, has either focused on macro-
level institutional or technological developments (e.g. [23]) or on strategic responses and 
behavior patterns on the micro-level of firms and individuals (e.g. [67,64,46]), but has 
neglected the level of interactions among different public and private actors in the wider 
organizational and regulatory field (see [2] for an exception). Although regulation does play a 
role in several studies on industry evolution (e.g. [86,20]), the role of regulatory uncertainty 
in obstructing or stimulating business model innovation has rarely been considered. As an 
exception, Meijer and colleagues [60] explicitly study actors’ perceptions of different sources 
of uncertainty to understand innovation decisions better, and find that uncertainty seems to 
block some but inspire others to achieve a transition. 
2.2 Industry Events as Discursive Spaces for Regulatory Conversations 
Regulatory conversations take place in processes of rule-setting between regulating bodies 
and practitioners in a field, for example in the form of expert opionions or lobbying activites 
[82]. In private regulation initiatives via standards [16,13], regulatory conversations often take 
place solely among practitioners. Regulatory conversations may either clarify or obscure the 
interpretation of, and guide the implementation of different types of regulation. The processes 
of rule-setting, rule interpretation, and rule implementation are typically cases of “distributed 
agency, not only in terms of actors but also in terms of activities” [72].  
Recent work on the evolution of organizational, institutional, technological, or professional 
fields has recognized the importance of field configuring events (FCEs) [53,62] in facilitating 
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such distributed regulatory processes. At FCEs, actors from diverse backgrounds encounter 
each other and ideas proliferate, allowing for intended and unintended processes of field 
configuration [53]. In their study of a transnational regulatory process facilitated by a series of 
United Nations conferences, Hardy and Maguire [39] draw on Hajer’s [36] concept of 
discursive spaces, defined as physical or virtual spaces in which actors discuss, debate, and 
dispute issues important to them. They argue that FCEs provide multiple overlapping 
discursive spaces that allow both powerful and peripheral actors to drive or hinder change in 
transnational regulations through the production, distribution and consumption of texts that 
can flow between the discursive spaces. FCEs, therefore, not only provide opportunities for 
face-to-face dialogue that concentrates dominant frames and story lines both temporally and 
locally [8,77], but also create places “where new things can be said and new social structures 
envisioned” [39].  
In the context of a changing industry under regulatory uncertainty, industry events such as 
trade fairs or conferences are likely to act as FCEs, because the discursive interactions taking 
place at such events allow for collective sensemaking [67], but also allow participants to 
strategically propagate their accounts while challenging those of competing actors [59]. In our 
research context, this means that participants may use industry events as platforms to exploit 
regulatory uncertainty by discursively positioning their distinct visions of the music industry’s 
future business models. These accounts are then reflected in related media coverage [3] – 
external discursive spaces addressed via communications circulated beyond the event itself 
[39]. Although regulatory conversations are conducted via different channels and at multiple 
locales, they are thus likely to unfold at industry events and their surrounding discursive 
spaces. 
3. Research Setting and Methodology 
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The popular music industry is one of the core copyright industries, defined as “those 
industries whose primary purpose is to create, produce, distribute or exhibit copyright 
materials.” [78]. Of all the different copyright industries, the music industry was the first to 
experience substantive threats to a major part of its established business model – selling CDs 
on the consumer market for music – when digitization and Internet file-sharing of MP3-
compressed music emerged during the late 1990s [35,64,83,91]. As shown by recent 
developments in the film and publishing industries, here the music industry was more of a 
front-runner than an exception in facing challenges in the course of digitization [27,57], 
which makes it a particularly interesting field for studying the link between regulatory 
processes and business model innovation.  
The rationale for selecting the German music industry as a case for investigating how 
regulatory uncertainty is addressed at industry events is twofold. First, Germany is the third 
largest consumer market, with strong subsidiaries or – as in the case of EMI – even 
headquarters of international music industry incumbents. Second, Germany has a highly 
dynamic and internationally recognized music industry event landscape, culminating in the 
recent deconstruction of the Popkomm, traditionally one of the three largest music industry 
fairs worldwide, and the parallel emergence of several challenging events. Our study 
addresses both the macro-level development of the event landscape in the German popular 
music industry between 2001 and 2010, in order to account for dynamics in the event-related 
discursive spaces that are provided, and the media discourse triggered by four selected events 
in those years. We chose this ten-year period as being critical for the copyright discourse in 
Germany, as copyright became a major issue for national legislatures in Europe only after the 
passing of the EU Copyright Directive in 2001.  
Our analysis largely follows Hajer’s [36,37] method of an argumentative discourse analysis. 
Hajer defines discourse as “an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories through which 
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meaning is given to phenomena” and argues that successful discourse may be solidified into 
an institution, a process called “discourse institutionalization” [36] (see also [34]). Prevailing 
in conflict-ridden discursive processes are those social constructs shared by the wider group 
of people: the dominant discourse coalition. Any discourse coalition is “related to practices in 
the context in which actors employ story lines and (re)produce and transform particular 
discourses” [37]. These story lines are the medium of political action, as they suggest certain 
positions and practices, and criticize others. A discourse coalition thus includes the following 
elements: a set of story lines, the actors that utter these story lines, and the practices that 
conform to these story lines [36]. Importantly, while paying attention to strategic action and 
power, the discourse coalition approach also illuminates the unintended (re-)production of a 
discursive bias by different actors who do not necessarily share deep values or orchestrate 
their activities, but cluster around specific story lines held together by the “discursive affinity” 
of their arguments [36]. As meanings are produced interactively, an argumentative discourse 
analysis is based on the detailed examination of accounts of these interactions [37]. 
In conducting a discourse analysis, Hajer [37] proposes examining statements that are often 
conveyed in the form of a narrative, i.e. as story lines with a beginning, a mid point, and an 
end. Often, people use short cues rather than telling the whole story, which is the reason why 
people who do not actually share the same understanding may still form a joint discourse 
coalition, assuming that the same narrative is shared by others. In this paper we apply this 
approach in a more focused way and pre-select certain sites of argumentative exchange by 
focusing on industry events in the German music industry, because, as we have argued before, 
they are sites particularly well-suited for presenting positions and exchanging ideas. In 
Hajer’s terms and in line with Hardy and Maguire’s [39] concept of discursive spaces, events 
are sites where story lines are constructed and discourse coalitions formed and maintained.  
3.1 Data Collection 
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In order to understand when the regulation of copyright was picked up as an issue and by 
whom, we first constructed a chronology of all events with a conference or convention section 
in the music industry between 2001 and 2010. We searched through the archive of the main 
music industry magazine in Germany, the Musikwoche, featuring an extensive weekly event 
calendar to identify all industry events in a year. First, we searched for several German 
synonyms for the term “conference”
4
, as well as for the English terms “conference” and 
“camp”, and included all our findings into an event database. This initial search yielded 77 
results. We consolidated this list by first exluding all events from other countries (e.g. the 
Amsterdam Dance Event) and from other industries such as the Frankfurt book fair. We also 
excluded mere music festivals that did not have at least one official discussion panel, as we 
did not consider these events to be critical for the formation of discourse coalitions. Second, 
we looked for additional online information on the remaining events to collect their beginning 
and end date as well as their mission and content. On this basis we further reduced our initial 
list and deleted international events that only took place once in Germany (e.g. the WOMEX 
world music fair). We also merged events that were listed as separate, but actually belonged 
to one event, such as the International MatchMaking Event that was a regular part of the 
Popkomm between 2005 and 2007. Our final list comprised 25 events.
5
  
From this basis, we zoomed into a selection of four highly significant event series to gain 
insights into core issues, debates, and actor groups that have dominated the copyright and 
associated industry transformation discourse in the German popular music industry since 
2001: the Popkomm, the c/o pop/C’n’B, the Reeperbahn Festival/Campus, and the 
all2gethernow (a2n). The four events are theoretically relevant [89] because they all stand for 
alternative conceptions about the dominant and most promising business models in the music 
                                            
4
 “Konferenz” (conference), “Messe” (fair), “Kongress” (congress) 
5
 We checked how biased the Musikwoche, as the main industry magazine, was by searching through an 
alternative German news source, gulli.com, a webportal reporting about music production and distribution 
models compatible with peer-to-peer file-sharing. We could only confirm one missing event there, the “Cologne 
Commons”, which is why we accepted this bias as an acceptable limitation. 
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industry. The Popkomm is the biggest event that took place regularly throughout our selected 
time period and stands for the mainstream music industry dominated by major-labels. A large 
international industry fair, the Popkomm was attracted away from Cologne by the city of 
Berlin in 2004. It was canceled in 2009 with reference to illegal downloads
6
 and the resulting 
revenue loss in the music industry, and has since been trying unsucessfully to recover under 
the label of Berlin Music Week. The Popkomm-move was countered with the founding of the 
c/o pop in Cologne in 2004, which established a new conference format, the Create and 
Business Convention C’n’B, in 2009. The Reeperbahn Festival in Hamburg is a live music 
festival modeled on the South by Southwest event in Texas; it complemented its original 2006 
format with a conference section, the Reeperbahn Campus, in 2009, the year of the Popkomm 
cancellation. In this year, the all2gethernow was founded as a counter-event in Berlin, using a 
decidedly different event format from the Popkomm.  
These three latter events thus represent alternatives to the Popkomm’s exclusive industry 
focus. While we expect partly overlapping discourse coalitions and story lines regarding 
copyright regulation and related business models at the Popkomm and c/o pop/C’n’B, we 
expect differences at the latter two events, because the all2gethernow is more targeted 
towards the digital scene, whereas the Reeperbahn Festival/Campus is geared towards live 
music rather than the recorded music business. These four events are repeatedly compared 
and jointly discussed in the industry press
7
, including online polls among readers asking 
which event to attend, so we consider these events representative of the main lines of debate 
in the German music industry and comparable regarding their visibility and discursive impact, 
which is also evidenced by the number of conference sessions and visitors at these events. 
The Popkomm, as formerly the world's third largest music industry fair, attracted about 
                                            
6
 See Handelsblatt, June 19, 2009, http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/it-medien/popkomm-wegen-
piraterie-protest-abgesagt;2375028 [accessed: March 28, 2010] 
7
 Unlike other event series such as the Pop-Up in Leipzig or the popforum in Mannheim, which have a similar 
format. 
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15,000 visitors for over 800 exhibits from over 50 countries. The c/o pop’s C'n'B Convention 
has been attended on average by about 1000 visitors from over 20 countries, engaging in 
about 60 different conference, networking, or panel sessions offered during a two-day period. 
The Reeperbahn Campus now features more than 100 different program items and attracts 
about 1500 visitors. Finally, the first a2n edition comprised more than 100 sessions and was 
attended by over 1000 visitors. 
We took media reporting of these events as a proxy for their role in regulatory conversations 
and conducted a comprehensive media search as a basis for our argumentative discourse 
analysis. Overall, our aim was to identify compatible and incompatible story lines, associate 
them with certain actor groups (not) participating at these events, and link them to field-level 
practices in terms of the business models or regulatory initiatives pursued. To establish our 
database, we searched both regional (Berliner Zeitung, Rheinische Post Düsseldorf, 
Hamburger Abendblatt) and national newspapers (Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung) as well as the main music industry magazine Musikwoche for references 
to each of the three events in the 10 years from 2001 to 2010. We collapsed all the articles 
into one file for each medium and event (e.g. Popkomm-Berliner Zeitung, Popkomm-FAZ 
etc.). If articles came up several times because all three events were mentioned in one article, 
we included only one instance of the respective passage in our analysis to avoid duplicates.  
Additionally, at least one of the authors attended the c/o pop/C’n’B between 2008 and 2010, 
the Popkomm in 2010, and the all2gethernow in 2009 and 2010. We recorded many panel 
discussions, collected leaflets and other documents distributed at the event, and engaged in 
informal conversations with the participants and exhibitors. We also conducted sixteen 
interviews with event organizers for background information on each event. The interviews 
lasted between 30 and 90 minutes approximately and were attended by at least one researcher. 
We selected the core organizing team including the founders of each event as interviewees to 
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get a broad range of perspectives. All the interviews were semistructured and guided by an 
interview protocol comprising five elements: a reflection of what happened in 2009, the 
development history of each event, the events’ vision for the future of the industry, the 
organizing team and participants over time, and the role of specific topics such as digital 
distribution. All the interviews were recorded and transcribed. An overview of the collected 
data can be found in Table 1.  
 c/o pop/C’n’B all2gethernow Popkomm Reeperbahn 
Interviews I 1: Founder/ CEO I 5: Founder/CEO I 9: Founder/ 
Former CEO 
I 15: Founder/ 
CEO 
 I 2: Head of 
Convention 
I 6: Head of Event I 10: Head of 
Conference 
I 16: Head of 
Program 
 I 3: Head of 
Strategy 
I 7: Member of 
Organizing Team I 
I 11: Manager 
Exhibition 
 
 I 4: Head of 
Finance 
I 8: Member of 
Organizing Team II 
I 12: Manager 
Marketing  
 
   I 13: Manager Event I   





















Industry press: Musikwoche, Musikmarkt (only 2008-2010) 
Daily Press: 
National Newspapers: Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
Regional Newspapers:. Berliner Zeitung (Berlin), Rheinische Post Düsseldorf (Cologne), 
Hamburger Abendblatt (Hamburg) 
* These formal interviews were conducted for an evaluation project concerning the C’n’B event format. They 
provided us with background information about how participants perceived the new convention compared to the 
other events we studied. We have not systematically coded these interviews, however, so we list them here under 
observations.  
**  c/o pop conference was established in 2005 
*** Reeperbahn Campus Conference was established in 2009 
Table 1: Database 
3.2 Data Analysis 
While we used the interview transcripts and participant observations as background 
information for our analysis, we systematically coded all the media data using the Atlas.ti 
content analysis software. First, we searched through all the media texts for passages referring 
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to the broader theme of “copyright”. This search was done manually, as we read through all 
the texts in order to get a grasp of the material at hand. To ensure similar interpretations, we 
started to read through and code the same texts separately and then compared our coding 
results. After having resolved differences in coding, we divided the material for the rest of the 
coding process, but jointly discussed unclear cases. We cross-checked this coding process by 
searching for a list of key words related to copyright
8
. We found some additional passages in 
this way that we had overlooked in the manual search and, if relevant, coded these as well.  
We then fine-coded the respective passages with respect to the types of actors making certain 
statements and the kinds of arguments made. This fine-coding was conducted by one author 
and then cross-checked by the other. We counted as statements all demands, proposals, 
criticisms, and decisions referring to copyright issues, following the process of a political 
claims analysis described by Haunss and Kohlmorgen [40]. Overall, we coded 434 passages 
that referred to the issue of copyright. These contained 34 different claims and, altogether, 
381 instances of claims were reported. Independent of the content, we coded the year of each 
press article and the event context in which a claim was made. We were thus able to say what 
type of actor made what claim at which point in time. Aiming to get a better understanding of 
the structure of the discourse with respect to both copyright regulation and business models, 
we classified each claim as either “conservative” or “reformist”. As can be seen in Table A.1 
in the Appendix, we categorized 13 claims as conservative and 15 claims as reformist. Six 
claims were not typical of any position. Furthermore, we grouped claims into one of three 
inductively derived alternative business models: the “music as a commodity model” (COM), 
the “music as a service or promotion tool model” (SPM), and the “music as a public good 
                                            
8
 This list of keywords was generated through the initial manual coding process. Search words included: 
“copyright”, "downloads", "legal", "digital rights", "DRM", but also German words such as "Regulierung" 
(regulation), "Urheber" (author), "Pirat" (pirate), "Eigentum" (ownership), "Werte" (values), "Rechte" (rights). 
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model” (PGM) (see also Table A.1). These models are described in more detail in the findings 
section. 
4. Findings: The Copyright Discourse in the German Music Industry  
The presentation of our findings follows the two steps of our analyis, focussing first on the 
evolution of the overall event landscape and then discussing the regulatory discourse 
associated with four selected, central events. 
4.1 Event Landscape in the German Music Industry  
We identified 25 different event series that took place in parallel or at different time periods in 
the German music industry between 2001 and 2010 and that also fulfilled our selection 
criterion of being a public event hosting some sort of conference where industry-related issues 
were discussed. Generally, we observed a steady rise in the number of events with conference 
sections where regulatory issues were discussed from only six in the year 2001 to 20 in the 
year 2010 (Figure 1). The only event series that ran through the entire time period were the 
Popkomm, the DJ Meeting, and the Music City Hamburg. Of these, the Popkomm is the only 
event of international scope addressing the entire popular music industry. The Music City 
Hamburg, by contrast, is a regional music industry meeting; the DJ Meeting is a fair and 
conference exclusively targeting the DJ scene. Some events such as the c/o pop/C’n’B and the 
Reeperbahn Festival/Campus are music festivals with a conference section. Others, such as 
the Popkomm, My Music or the Pop Up are trade fairs with both a festival and a conference 
section. Finally, some events are predominantely discussion platforms, either dedicated to 
special issues such as the Green Music Initiative or more general issues such as the Future 
Music Camp. 
The first event that disappeared from the landscape in 2004 was Musik und Maschine in 
Berlin. Led by Dimitri Hegemann (owner of the Tresor-Club, Berlin) and Jeff Mills (Techno 
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DJ, Detroit), it was one of the first events in Germany discussing topics such as copyright and 
the role of major labels in the music industry. The pop:forum Branchenmeeting, taking place 
first in Stuttgart, then in Mannheim, ended in 2005, together with the Munich Mobile Music 
Conference, which was only founded in 2004. The pop:forum was dedicated to debating the 
future music industry and had Gerd Gebhardt, at that time head of the German Music Industry 
Association, as its patron. The Mobile Music Conference was only a short event to discuss 
business models related to mobile phones and music. In 2009, two further event series ended: 
the relatively small Musikfachtagung organized by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (the 
political foundation of the conservative party CDU) and the Popkomm. The Popkomm 
reappeared in 2010 under the umbrella of Berlin Music Week. A more detailed view of the 
evolving event landscape can be seen in Table A.2 in the Appendix.  
 
Figure 1: Evolution of the event landscape in the German music industry from 2001 to 2010. 
While some events have an openly conservative orientation towards the regulation of 
copyright, i.e. target the protection of existing business models, others debate entirely 
different themes such as the integrative role of music in the context of migration policy 
(Musikfachtagung). In 2009, two events, the Future Music Camp and the all2gethernow, were 
founded using a barcamp rather than a conference-format to initiate a more open debate about 
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the future of the music industry and related copyright regulation. Both events are inherently 
focused on digital business, but only the all2gethernow is rooted in the open source 
community.  
Looking at the evolution of the event landscape in the German music industry as a whole, the 
most striking finding is the overall increase in the number of events during a period of 
perceived industry crisis. The organizers of these events do not necessarily come from the 
core music industry, but are diverse actors ranging from the telecommunications and IT 
industries (Mobile Music Conference, Cebit Sounds, all2gethernow) to political foundations 
(Musikfachtagung), and even to regional politicians (forward2business-Zukunftskongress) and 
festival organizers seeking to seize the opportunity provided by uncertainty to gain funding 
and visibility through a new conference section (C’n’B, Reeperbahn Campus). The next 
section tries to capture the dynamics of regulatory claims made by different actors during the 
past decade in the context of selected events. 
4.2 Discourse on Copyright and Business Models at Industry Events over Time  
When looking at the overall timeline of claims (Figure 2) and the development of concrete 
claims behind it (Table A.3), we identify three phases with respectively dominant story lines.  
Figure 2: Overall timeline of business model claims between 2001 and 2010. 
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In the first period between 2001 and 2003, DRM was debated as a solution to the music 
industry’s crisis, preserving the dominant music-as-a-commodity business model that is based 
on the strict enforcement of copyright regarding the sale and consumption of recorded music. 
The precondition to DRM strategies working was the legal protection of DRM technologies 
against circumenvention, the so-called “anti-circumvention provisions”, which had to be 
implemented on a national level. In Germany, a penality for the circumvention of copy 
protection measures was introduced into national copyright law in a first copyright reform 
basket in September 2003, a measure welcomed by industry actors such as major label 
representatives:  
“But now major labels want to strike back. Before long the new copyright law will come into effect, 
which forbids the circumvention of copy protection of music CDs.” (Hamburger Abendblatt, 2003)  
However, in this first period industry incumbents already remained under pressure and we 
observe a growing number of claims that call for new business models. These new models re-
conceptualized music as a service or as a promotion tool and were typically made by actors 
new to the music business and aiming to occupy a niche in the reconfiguring music value 
chain (e.g. “Microsoft wants to forestall competitor Apple with its new offers in Europe”, 
FAZ 2003). 
In the second period, between 2004 and 2007, incumbents began implementing DRM and not 
many issues were debated at all. The claim that filesharing was causing the industry crisis, 
prominent in the first phase, as well as the discussion of alternative business models declined. 
In 2008, a third period started when it became clear that DRM was not the solution to the 
music industry’s problems. Starting with EMI in late 2007, the major labels abandoned DRM 
strategies one after another. In this period, claims were increasingly voiced that government 
needs to act, enforcing copyright more strictly: 
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“Dieter Gorny [head of the German Music Industry Association] pled for an intensified battle against 
pirated copies: ‘The notion of a bagatelle is deadly!’” (Hamburger Abendblatt, 2008) 
This period culminated in the Popkomm cancellation, which was used to again propagate the 
message that Internet filesharing is illegal and was causing the crisis of the music industry 
(see also Table 2). Voices more diverse than in the first period grew stronger to counter this 
claim, arguing that the music industry was failing to innovate and that this was the main 
reason for its crisis:  
“Seipenbusch [then head of the German Pirate Party] attracted attention mainly through statements such 
as ‘the whining cries of the music industry remind us of coachmen after the introduction of the 
automobile’.” (Musikwoche, 2009) 
This counter-narrative or alternative story line manifested itself in the foundation of new 
events, most notably the all2gethernow. But in addition to re-emerging claims for service or 
promotion business models (e.g. “[M]usic such […] is only an ‘add-on’, an instrument for 
customer loyalty together with other products,” FAZ, 2008), the conception of music as a 
public good that is financed, for instance, with so-called cultural flatrate models was 
introduced into the debate by new actors such as the Pirate Parties (e.g. “Everything must be 
permitted, as long as there is no commercial background,” MM, 2009). Figure 3 depicts the 
frequency of claims relating to the different business models over time, and Table A.3 gives 
coding examples of the three business model categories. 
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Figure 3: Frequency of claims related to different music industry business models between 2001 and 2010. 
When looking at the types of claims made in relation to our four different events, the 
following picture appears (Figure 4): whereas the all2gethernow, the c/o pop/C’n’B and the 
Reeperbahn Festival/Campus were represented by more reformist positions, the Popkomm 
was dominantly associated with conservative claims. It is hereby important to note, however, 
that both in articles about the c/o pop/C’n’B and about the all2gethernow a number of the 
conservationist positions coded result from references to the Popkomm cancellation and hence 
were not positions directly voiced at these events. Conservative claims were therefore 
strongly present in the reporting of all events – which indicates that event organizers cannot 
necessarily control how their event will be represented in the media. Of the 122 conservative 
claims made in relation to the Popkomm, 29 were made with reference to its cancellation. 
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Figure 4: Conservative, reformist and other claims related to the events under study. 
The role of the media as a non-neutral arbiter becomes very visible when looking at the actors 
behind the different claims (Figure 5): media actors not only report on claims, but also make 
claims themselves as commentators. In our case, media commentators have a strong bias 
towards reformist positions (ratio of 2 to 1), thereby contributing to putting conservative 
claims by industry actors into a critical perspective.  
Figure 5: Actors making conservative, reformist and other business model claims. 
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Overall, we identified 21 different actor groups. The most dominant actor after media 
commentators themselves is Dieter Gorny, Popkomm founder and now head of the German 
Music Industry Association and one of the most prominent lobbyists for the music industry. 
Gorny accounts for almost a quarter of all claims, not least because he attributed the 
Popkomm cancellation to Internet piracy. Dieter Gorny is followed by the music industry, i.e. 
the major labels, the Business Association of German Music Publishers, and indie label 
representatives. Together, these four actors account for more than half (153 of 381) of the 
claims overall. Most of the claims of these actors were conservative. This conservative group 
is followed by a smaller group of actors with mostly reformist claims: complementary 
industries (comprising the games industry, ISP providers, etc.), the Pirate Party, and various 
experts such as professors, journalists, and bloggers. Examples of the most prominent claims 
of each actor group with more than 10 claims can be seen in Table A.4. 
Half of the claims attributed to creators such as artists or authors could not be clearly 
categorized as either conservative or reformist; this reflects the fact that, while generally 
agreeing with the pro-copyright stance of the industry actors, artists are not content with how 
industry actors are handling these issues, for example in terms of revenue distribution. The 
least represented actors are the organizers of the Reeperbahn Festival/Campus. Tim Renner, 
former Universal Music CEO and now an author, head of a radio station and head of the 
all2gethernow conference, can be associated with very different kinds of claims depending on 
which role he had at a given time.  
When calculating the mean position of the different actor groups on a conservative-reformist 
scale (Figure 6), two discourse coalitions can be identified, one at the conservative end of the 
spectrum consisting of Dieter Gorny (as both former Popkomm founder and head of the 
German Music Industry Association), the German collecting society GEMA, the industry 
associations, and Tim Renner as Universal manager. This coalition also includes, in a slightly 
 25
weaker form, the authors/artists and their representative organizations, collectively organized 
as ADAM (Alliance of German Music-Author Associations) since the 2009 c/o pop/C’n’B 
event. Furthermore, the major and indie labels, and politicians are positioned on the 
conservative half of the spectrum, albeit in a weaker form. On the reformist side, there are no 
actors directly involved in the music industry value chain, but rather the media, different 
kinds of experts, users and consumers, as well as actors from complementary fields such as 
the games industry and the event organizers (excluding the Popkomm).  
 
Figure 6: Discourse coalitions in the German music industry. 
5. Discussion  
5.1 Discourse Coalitions and Regulatory Propaganda at Industry Events 
Our findings revealed two clearly identifiable discourse coalitions with respect to copyright 
regulation: conservatives on the one side aiming to preserve, strengthen, and better enforce 
existing copyright, and reformists on the other side, arguing for a copyright reform that takes 
into account new Internet user practices such as filesharing. Behind the conservative coalition 
are industry incumbents that cling to the traditional dominant logic [9] of music as a 
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commodity: trade associations, collecting societies, labels, some artists, and the Popkomm as 
the incumbent industry event. In the reformist coalition, we find mainly actors from outside of 
the traditional music industry value chain, embracing two different avenues of business model 
innovation: music as a service or promotion tool, and music as a public good. Whereas the 
former is propagated mainly by corporate officials from related industries such as 
communications service providers or the gaming industry, the latter model is advocated by 
political actors such as digital rights NGOs, actors from the open source scene such as the 
all2gethernow organizers, and Pirate Party representatives.  
What allows these two different actor groups to form a reformist discourse coalition in the 
sense of Hajer [36] is that both agree about repudiating overly restrictive enforcement 
measures. While their motives – profit with web-based services on the one hand, free speech 
and open access to digital goods on the other – may be different, their claims are compatible. 
This is in line with Hajer’s [36] notion of a discursive affinity of certain arguments that do not 
necessarily require the sharing of deep values or a deliberate orchestration of activities. We 
also find some actors at the fringes of the two dominant discourse coalitions, some of which 
position themselves deliberately as outside of copyright disputes. The Reeperbahn 
Festival/Campus organizers, for instance, are the weakest actor group in our sample. This is 
because the Reeperbahn Festival stands for live music, a business model that has always been 
successful in the music industry and that remains untouched – or even silently profits – from 
regulatory uncertainty. Authors and artists are only weakly conservative, because they are 
engaged in a somewhat separate discourse – on the role and practices of collecting societies. 
Thus there is a little discursive affinity between these groups and the reformist discourse 
coalition. 
Interestingly, the reformist and the conservative coalitions only rarely criticize each other, but 
instead address third parties [16] with their claims, especially the national legislature (with 
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diverging regulatory demands), and the wider public (with moral pleas and oppositional story 
lines). Because of this discursive pattern, we prefer to speak of “regulatory propaganda” 
rather than regulatory conversations [10], as industry events are not used to engage in a 
dialogue and work towards reducing regulatory uncertainty, but rather to mobilize support for 
particular positions [73]. One explanation for this finding may lie in the fact that the events in 
our sample do not have a regulatory mandate and are not explicitly organized to develop new 
regulatory structures, unlike the United Nations [39] or technology [33] conferences. Instead, 
the events were organized by actors aiming to take part in regulatory debate or profit from 
regulatory uncertainty. Event organizers are hereby not only facilitators or arbiters, but self-
interested actors “with an eye towards influencing field evolution” [53], who position their 
events in the midst of public debates in a competition for audiences and media attention [74].  
The increasing number of events may be seen as a by-product of regulatory uncertainty: 
uncertainty creates the need for sensemaking and coping, and discursive interaction facilitated 
by events is one way of achieving both. Uncertainty thus provides opportunities for lobbyists, 
entrepreneurs, or activists to open up and occupy new discursive spaces. The foundation of a 
new event, the all2gethernow, for instance, bundled the claims of dispersed reformist actors 
and has helped to bring reformist issues such as alternative licensing [21], the introduction of 
a flatrate fee for music and culture, or the reform of collecting societies onto the public 
agenda. In turn, the cancellation of a central event, in our case the Popkomm, was a powerful 
discursive strategy to transport the claims made by the conservative coalition, because all 
event-related reporting in the year of the cancellation made references to the industry crisis 
allegedly caused by illegal downloading. At the same time, the Popkomm cancellation opened 
a void that challenging actors could step into and open up a new discourse around music as a 
public good. As a potentially unintended side effect, the absence of a strong industry platform 
left the major and indie labels, as well as incumbent technology firms such as Microsoft or 
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Apple relatively silent in the media debate, and tended to allow societal actors to propose their 
own vision of the industry’s future business model. This notion of event foundation and 
cancellation as a discursive strategy presents an important addition to the recent literature on 
discourse and FCEs [39,92]. Specifically, our re-conceptualization of FCEs not only as 
discursive spaces providing a stage for third parties but, at the same time, as discursive 
artifacts themselves could be analyzed in other contexts. 
5.2 Cycles of Regulatory Propaganda and Business Model Innovation  
Taking industry events as sites for studying regulatory conversations in a field not only 
allowed us to track actors and claims, but also to observe discursive dynamics over a longer 
period of time. Our study is unique in that it illustrates which actor groups in a transforming 
field develop and maintain certain positions over time. In the case of the music industry, a 
dominant position based on past successful business models persisted among the core music 
industry actors throughout the ten-year period. While these actors lobbied for regulatory 
changes to preserve the old business model, new business models were mainly introduced by 
actors complementary to the traditional value chain or by societal actors. These actors are 
either not directly affected by copyright or would benefit from its abandonment, so they are 
not locked in by existing business models [17] and can more easily imagine alternatives under 
new regulatory structures.  
Interestingly, the intensity of discourse varied as the perceived need for regulatory changes in 
the light of new business models changed and a clear address for claims existed. In the first 
(2001-2003) and in the third phases (2008-2010), industry actors sought government 
protection, initially by anti-circumvention provisions to protect private DRM standards and 
then, after the failure of DRM, by regulating Internet technologies more generally. These 
efforts were met in each phase by a rising number of reformist claims, introduced largely by 
new actors entering the field. This points to an overall cyclical nature of regulatory 
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propaganda, where regulatory uncertainty returns as actors fail to innovate in the realm of 
existing regulatory settings. These cycles of high and low levels of regulatory discourse are 
not to be confused with phases of technological or industry life cycles (e.g. [48,85]), but 
instead resemble the ups and downs of business cycles. Their dynamics and outcomes may, 
however, be one factor that drives the transition from one stage in an industry or technological 
life cycle to the next.  
At least in public, the music industry in our case maintained strong conservative positions 
when uncertainty was high, although the radical changes in positions found between active 
and past major label managers indicate that awareness of the need to innovate clearly existed. 
While in individual cases we did observe changes in positions over time, we cannot report 
similar findings on all individual actors that were quoted in our study, because our analysis 
was not fine-grained enough. Our general impression is, however, that organizational actors 
largely maintained their positions over the ten-year-period. This stability of actor positioning 
is also evidenced by the fact that new business model conceptions, such as the public goods 
model introduced at the end of the second period (2004-2007), were propagated by new actors 
(e.g. Pirate Party members). Established actors, be they conservative or reformist, mainly re-
phrased and re-emphasized their claims for the commodity and the service or promotion 
model respectively when discourse intensity rose again in period three (2008-2010). 
Compared to their industry associations, the major and indie labels in our sample were only 
moderately conservative. This finding points to an interesting division of labor within the 
group of incumbent actors, which may also inform research on organizational field 
transformation (e.g. [42]). As private actors, it seems that the labels want to present 
themselves as innovative and successful enterprises and therefore deny that there is an 
industry crisis. Instead, they stress possibilities for business model innovation, including 
DRM, but also their new role as service providers for artists. Conservative claim making is 
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left to the trade associations, meta-organizations [1] that seem to utilize events strongly as 
discursive spaces.  
Surprisingly, we did not find any claim on the transnational nature of copyright regulation in 
the Internet age. This emphasizes, first, the importance of national regulatory discourse even 
in globalized industries such as the music industry. Second, it points to the need for research 
on regulatory struggles not only on the transnational, but also on national levels, even in fields 
with strong transnational regulation such as the field of copyright [21].  
Generally, our findings strongly support the role of regulatory struggles in mediating the link 
between disruptive technologies and business model innovation. Similar to the pharma 
industry [75], technological discontinuities per se did not trigger a shift in the dominant 
industry logic. Instead, the most radical impulses for change in our study stemmed from a 
growing political and societal movement towards making copyright less relevant in the 
production of cultural goods [22] – a shift comparable to new healthcare philosophies – and 
actors entering from other industries. These actors do not benefit from extant regulation and 
embrace regulatory uncertainty as an opportunity to develop and propose new business 
models. Those already practicing new business models, the majority of musicians and artists, 
remained largely absent from the regulatory debate. 
Finally, the findings of this study seem to be most relevant for research on other cultural 
industries such as the film or the publishing industry, which are also copyright-based (e.g. 
[61]). With growing proliferation of broadband Internet access and of new devices such as 
smartphones or tablet PCs, these industries are likely to experience similar cycles of 
regulatory uncertainty with recurrent windows of opportunity for business model innovation. 
In particular, the change in consumer practices and according demands for regulatory changes 
that we observed in the music industry play a similar role in these markets, and incumbent 
organizations have been found to be similarly locked-in to past business models (e.g. [49,50] 
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for newspaper publishing). However, both regulatory and technological peculiarities of these 
markets, such as fixed book prices or bandwidth management by Internet service providers, 
may also complicate the transfer of our results.  
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Conclusions, Outlook and Implications for Management Practice 
Quite in contrast to the proposed crisis of the music industry, we can see a thriving event 
landscape. At least some of the newly founded events are social-movement like organizations 
seeking to open up the debate on copyright and to find new solutions and business models. 
Perhaps not in terms of financial revenues, but in terms of activism, debate, and exchange of 
ideas, the music industry appears lively. If this can be taken in any way as an indication, then 
we do not see a cultural decline caused by digital technology, but a challenging debate and a 
diverse set of practices regarding the use of music in modern cultural production. 
Building upon our findings, further research could examine whether different kinds of events 
facilitate different discursive patterns, depending on their mandate, their organizers, and their 
position in an organizational field. The role of the (non-neutral) arbiter that brings together 
these separate coalitions is rather taken up by the media, itself veering towards reformist 
positions. It would be interesting to compare what is actually said at events with the way it is 
represented by the media in order to enhance our understanding of the role of the media as a 
non-neutral arbiter and hence as an active member of discourse coalitions. 
In this context, studying the discursive strategies of different actors at different points in time 
within different discursive spaces would help to provide a more in-depth understanding of 
how incumbent-challenger dynamics play out in a transforming industry field. For instance, 
while organizing and cancelling events was an effective strategy used by both conservative 
and reformist actors aiming to mobilize support for certain positions, these strategies are 
likely to be complemented by direct lobbying efforts or other political activities, such as 
engaging in transnational regulatory arenas. 
Since our analysis was focused on Germany, further research could also systematically 
compare the shape of the evolving event landscapes and discourse coalitions in other 
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countries to see if similar themes or phases can be identified and whether the cyclical 
dynamic of regulatory debate can be confirmed. Our findings provide a first step towards 
more nation-based regulation studies, and we hope to have inspired research in this direction. 
Complementary research on different national regulatory processes, comparing regulatory 
propaganda across different cultural industries, would help to clarify whether we can see 
convergence in terms of discourse and business model approaches or whether differences, for 
example with regard to Digital Rights Management [27], still persist. These findings could 
then inform further research on why industry incumbents often fail to envision new forms of 
value proposition and value capture in the Internet age [87]. Specifically, the complementary 
interplay of cycles of regulatory uncertainty and propaganda described in this study and the 
cyclical nature of technological uncertainty [75,70] deserve closer investigation. 
For managers maneuvering businesses through periods of industry transformation, our 
analysis of regulatory propaganda in the music industry may be informative in at least three 
respects. First, business model innovation is likely to come from the fringes or even from 
actors external to the field. Under regulatory uncertainty, these are potential partners for 
strategic alliances to explore alternative avenues for industry development. Second, not only 
discourse at existing industry events but also the foundation of new and seemingly less central 
industry events may have a strong impact on how regulatory discourse unfolds – not least 
because new events are newsworthy just in themselves and their organizers have an eye 
towards field evolution. Attending these events may be an important source of fresh ideas for 
proactively addressing regulatory uncertainty. Third, the intensity of discourse on business 
model innovation and complementary regulation is likely to be cyclical in nature, depending 
on the perceived acuteness of an industry crisis. Consequently, industry crisis rather than 
mere technological developments opens up discursive spaces for introducing new or 
alternative business models. While departing further from established paths with new 
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business models may be particularly promising in times of crisis, therefore, this also suggests 
making counter-cyclical investments in business model exploration as a strategy for 
generating competitive advantages in the medium- and long-run.  
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Conservative (13 claims) Frequency 
Internet file sharing causes crisis. 63 
Government needs to act (enforce copyright, protect industry, regulate 
internet). (COM) 40 
DRM is the solution. (COM) 21 
Artists need to be remunerated/respect artists’ rights. 16 
Internet filesharing is stealing. (COM) 10 
Copyright enforcement works. (COM) 7 
Flatrate won't work/is the new broadcast fee. 6 
Legal basis of copyright needs to be accepted. (COM) 6 
Pirate Party only wants votes/is not serious. 6 
Creative Commons does not work. (COM) 4 
New business models don't work. (COM) 4 
Cultural variety/quality will die along with employment. 3 
GEMA-flatrate/GEMA works. 3 
Total (conservative) 189 
  
Reformist (15 claims)  
New business models are emerging. (SPM) 29 
Music industry failed to innovate/is outdated. 25 
DRM does not work. 24 
Industry needs to and can change/innovate. (SPM) 19 
Internet filesharing (alone) is not the problem. 11 
Criminalization strategy will not work. 10 
Industry criminalizes fans. 10 
Copyright is anachronistic/instrumentalized by industry. (PGM) 9 
Internet filesharing should be legalized. 7 
GEMA distribution of royalties too complicated. 6 
Flatrate as an option. (PGM) 5 
Internet should not be regulated. (PGM) 5 
Need to include consumers, other industries in debate. (SPM) 4 
Open content licences as an option. (PGM) 4 
Artists need to take new roles (e.g. self-publishers). 2 
Total (reformist) 170 
  
Other (6 claims)  
GEMA does not protect artists. 6 
There is no crisis. 6 
Moral issue turned into a legal/business issue. 4 
New generation is a pirate generation. 4 
Musicians always had to struggle. 1 
We have never paid for the music. 1 
Total (other) 22 
Total (overall) 381 




Event Location Founding End 
Munich Mobile Music Conference Munich 2004 2005 
Hamburger Musikforum/VUT-Nord Stammtisch Hamburg 2004 - 
Popkomm Düsseldorf/Cologne/Berlin 1989 2012 
all2gethernow Berlin 2009 - 
Future Music Camp Mannheim 2009 - 
CeBit Sounds! Hannover 2010 - 
c/o pop/C'n'B Cologne 2004 - 
DJ Meeting Oberhausen 1990 - 
filmtonart - Tag der Filmmusik Munich 2009 - 
forward2business-Zukunftskongress Halle (Saale) 2002 - 
Green Music Initiative Roundtable Berlin 2009 - 
jazzahead! Bremen 2006 - 
Kinderlied-Kongress Hamburg 2007 - 
Jetztmusikfestival 2010/Time Warp Mannheim 2007 - 
MusicCity Hamburg Hamburg 1997 - 
Musik und Maschine Berlin 2000 2003 
Musikfachtagung (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung) Berlin 2002 2008 
My Music Friedrichshafen/Dresden 2007 - 
Pop Up - Messe Forum Musik Leipzig 2002 - 
pop:forum Stuttgart/Mannheim 2000 2006 
Popmeeting Niedersachsen Celle 2007 - 
Pop-Open Stuttgart Stuttgart 2005 - 
Reeperbahn Campus Hamburg 2009 - 
SoundTrack_Cologne Cologne 2004 - 
 
Table A.2: Event landscape in the German music industry  
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“New music CDs will only 
be available with copy 
protection. This is how 
labels want to stop illegal 
burning of CDs.” (SZ, 
2001) 
“That circumvention of copy 
protection will be legally 
banned in Germany is 
considered to be a 
success.” (FAZ, 2002) 
 “The music firms demand 
authoritative actions of the 
legislation against illegal 
copying.” (SZ, 2002) 
 
19 claims 
 “Corporations such as the 
Swiss SDC AGG 
presented DRM software 
to be used in online or 
mobile record stores such 
as iTunes (Apple) or 
Musicload (T-Online).” 
(RP, 2005) 
“Without DRM nothing goes 
at the industry’s top dogs” 
(MW, 2006) 
“Actually, the state would 
need to act here (…).” 
(SZ, 2007) 
41 claims 
“There is no way around 
regulating the Internet.” 
(MW, 2008) 
“Gorny blamed ‘inaction of 
politicians’ for cancelling 
the Popkomm.” (FAZ, 
2009)  
We ought not to sacrifice 
copyright on the altar of 
digital coolness.” (MW, 
2009)  
“It is a scandal that many 
authors go away empty-
handed from new Internet 
business models. Such an 
expropriation is not 
acceptable.” (MW, 2009) 




“The view that the sound 
carrier CD is a phase-out 
model is common wisdom. 
The ideal customer […] is 
automatically charged for 
his pre-paid music 
subscription.” (FAZ, 
2001) 
“To go against [illegal 
copying], the German 
music industry is going to 
launch a central supplier 
for legally downloading 
songs from the Internet.” 
(HA, 2003)  
“Microsoft will forestall 
competitor Apple with his 
new offers in Europe 
(…).” (FAZ, 2003) 
14 claims 
“Music is used as a free 
supplement and promotion 
gift, to sell detergent or 
hardware.” (FAZ, 2004) 
“New distribution and 
marketing channels are 
emerging: many 
newcomers such as the 
Arctic Monkeys became 
prominent via blogs.” (BZ, 
2006) 
“The music business on the 
Internet is booming in 
Germany as never before.” 
(HA, 2006) 
“The music streaming 
service mSpot/Remix was 
developed to deliver music 
to two billion mobile 
phone users.” (BZ, 2007) 
20 claims 
“Old discussions on the 
chances and risks of 
YouTube and MySpace 
are continued, music-on-
demand is being refined.” 
(FAZ, 2008) 
“Selling music via the 
Internet only works in 
connection with other 
business models – it is the 
cookie served with the 
coffee.” (MW, 2008) 
“The industry has done its 
homework and confronts 
the technological change 
with digital offers.” (MM, 
2009) 
 
Music as a 
public good 
no claims 2 claims 
“Rights holders should work 
with alternative licensing 
models, otherwise 
creativity and cultural 
diversity will be stifled.” 
(MW, 2007 
“A definitive yes to a clearly 
defined cultural flatrate.” 
(MW, 2007) 
21 claims 
“The most promising models 
are still flatrate models 
that allow the continued 
possession of music.” (SZ, 
2009) 
“Creative Commons licenses 
were discussed.” (MM, 
2009) 
“The Pirate Party is the 
figurehead of the 
movement, whose activists 
consider any intervention 
into the Internet as a 
mutilation of basic civil 
liberties.” (BZ, 2009) 
“[N]owadays, composing a 
truly ‘new’ song is 
impossible and thus 
copyright and GEMA are 
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dispensable.” (BZ, 2010) 
Legend: BZ = Berliner Zeitung, FAZ = Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, HA = Hamburger Abendblatt, MM = 
Musikmarkt, MW = Musikwoche, RP = Rheinische Post, SZ = Süddeutsche Zeitung 
Table A.3: Coding examples of dominant claims in different phases 
 
Actor  
(no. of claims) 
Coding examples of dominant claims in respective category 
Pirate Party  
(21) 
Internet filesharing should be legalized (7) 
“It does not lead anywhere to simply repudiate the existence of intellectual property, as 
the Pirate Party representative did.” (FAZ, 2009) 






Industry needs to and can change/innovate (3) 
“Record companies can survive, indeed – if only they re-define themselves as service 
providers to and not as masters of the artists.” (BZ, 2009) 
“ITunes and similar services have improved. The industry has finally understood that it 
has to create a legal option.” (SZ, 2009) 
Complementary 
industries   
(22) 
New business models are emerging (5) 
“The big business with music is over, copyright no longer plays a role in reality. (…) 
Peter Dürr, Head of Paid Services at United Internet AG, summed it up: music such 
as cum grano salis all digital content is only an ‘add-on’, an instrument for customer 
loyalty together with other products.” (FAZ, 2008) 
“’The true download game is only just starting now,’ claimed Patrick Sullivan, CEO of 




Industry needs to and can change/innovate (4) 
“The future lies in the Internet with its dramatically low distribution costs,’ said 
Michael Goodman, analyst of the Yankee Group.” (HA, 2002) 
“To bring money into the corporations’ pockets, market researchers have suggestions: 
all firms should eventually agree on one common online platform.” (HA, 2002) 
Media  
(77) 
Music industry failed to innovate (12 claims): 
“The five market leaders have not managed to establish one online standard that 
provides access to all their repertoires.” (FAZ, 2001) 
“The music industry has to realize that it cannot deal with its, at least partially, self-




Open content licenses as an option (2) 
“Also GEMA creators may write titles they want to publish under Creative Commons. 
This is going to be an issue.” (MW, 2007)  
“GEMA was never helpful for me, I only have to argue with them when I want to 
publish music under Creative Commons.” (MW, 2009) 
Major labels   
(44) 
Internet filesharing causes crisis (11 claims): 
“Dopp [CEO of Warner Music Germany], again mentioned ‘theft of intellectual 
property’ through the copy culture: ‘Beside an illegal oil well one cannot run a legal 
gas station’.” (FAZ, 2003) 
“The continued crisis, for which the industry still blames illegal copying of CDs, has 
been the issue at the last three Popkomm events in Berlin.” (BZ, 2007) 
Politicians  
(10) 
Government needs to act (3) 
“The passing of an enforcement directive is even more important than the copyright 
amendment.” (MW, 2006) 




Artists need to be remunerated/respect artists rights (6) 
“The Pirate Party has bats in the belfry and only wants to collect ‘cheap’ votes. I could 
get the new U2 album from the record store, of course, without stopping by at the 
cashier. That is exactly the same.” (MW, 2009) 
“Stefan Herwig (Dependent/Mindbase) emphasized the freedom to decide of the 
creatives: ‘The net culture must not ignore the artist who has decided to 
commercialize.’” (MW, 2009) 
Artists /authors  
(10) 
GEMA does not protect artists (4) 
“Only a minority of members profits from the GEMA system.” (SZ, 2010) 
“Conneman again attacked GEMA for not reacting to justified criticism.” (MM, 2010) 
German  Music 
Publishers 
Internet filesharing causes crisis (13 claims): 




property’ through the copy culture: ‘Beside an illegal oil well one cannot run a legal 
gas station’.” (FAZ, 2003) 
“The continued crisis, for which the industry still blames illegal copying of CDs, has 





Government needs to act (4) 
“The GEMA critically emphasizes that anyone who downloads music from the Internet 
violates copyrights.” (SZ, 2005) 
“It is a scandal that rights holders do not profit from the variety of new online business 
models.” (MW, 2009) 
Dieter Gorny  
(51) 
Internet filesharing causes crisis (20 claims): 
“Many firms cannot afford to participate at the Popkomm because of the theft on the 
Internet” (BZ, 2009) 
“If there is no action soon, all efforts of the industry will be futile.” (MM, 2009) 
Legend: BZ = Berliner Zeitung, FAZ = Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, HA = Hamburger Abendblatt, MM 
= Musikmarkt, MW = Musikwoche, RP = Rheinische Post, SZ = Süddeutsche Zeitung 
Table A.4: Coding examples of dominant claims per actor group (actors with > 4 claims) in the order of the 
reformist-conservative scale (Figure 6) 
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